Hi, my name is Kim. I\u2019m an ideologue.<\/p>\n
At least, according to Boghosian and Lindsay, I think I might be. They define ideologue as \u201cone who is unwilling or unable to revise their (moral) beliefs.\u201d[1]<\/a> And just to be clear, they portray an ideologue in, shall we say, less than complimentary terms.<\/p>\n I found How to Have Impossible Conversations<\/em> to have three main strengths. Boghosian and Lindsay prioritize having the right attitude toward an impossible conversation. Examples of this include their counsel to \u201cModel the behavior you want to see in your conversation partner,\u201d[2]<\/a> including building rapport [3]<\/a>and avoiding \u201cdelivering a message\u201d.[4]<\/a> Secondly, the authentic conversations used throughout the book helped me understand more deeply how to put their various principles into practice. Thirdly, I found a number of their principles surprising (i.e., I wouldn\u2019t have thought of them on my own) and immediately applicable. For example, the idea of tracking your effectiveness by asking, \u201cOn a scale from 1 to 10, how confident are you that X [the belief] is true?\u201d[5]<\/a><\/p>\n However, As I read through How to Have Impossible Conversations<\/em>, I began to feel some dissonance. I was often torn between appreciating their discussion of epistemology while also resonating with the \u201cmoral reasoning\u201d that says my religion\/faith\/God teaches me this is true, so I believe it to be true.[6]<\/a> I began to feel uncomfortable with the authors\u2019 criticism of \u201cthe moral mind overriding the rational mind\u201d[7]<\/a> and a line of questioning designed to \u201cdisconfirm\u201d a moral belief.[8]<\/a> As I mentally dug down into why that made me uncomfortable, I was reminded of Matthew Petrusek\u2019s book that we read last semester (I know, many of you are groaning. I seem to recall I was pretty much the only one in the cohort that liked that book.) Petrusek leaned on an \u201cinside-out\u201d approach to reasoning, illustrating how theological beliefs (on the outside of Petrusek’s circle) influence ontological, anthroplogical, epistemological, moral and finally political thinking, each layer influencing how one reasons through the next. [9]<\/a> This was Petrusek\u2019s way of explaining that whatever belief is most dearly held becomes the core and acts like a filter for all other knowledge, decisions, and beliefs. This is exactly what I see at play in Boghosian and Lindsay\u2019s discussion. They seem to assume rationalism or scientism as their core.<\/p>\n This line of thinking helped me understand the dissonance I was feeling. While I, of course, value reason and science, they are not my core belief. (And to be clear, I am open to reevaluating my beliefs\/moral stances within reason.) I\u2019ve given this quite a bit of thought lately, especially as I was asked to speak recently about the constancy of God. As part of this process I mulled over the question, \u201cWhat do I actually believe at my core and why?\u201d I settled on two core beliefs: God is good\/loving and he knows what is best for my life. As I shared with the church, thirty-six years ago, I decided to follow Jesus because I was convinced that he was good and loving and knew what was best for my life. Those are still the characteristics of God that I hold on to everyday. I can\u2019t think of a single piece of evidence or any circumstance which would disconfirm that belief.<\/p>\n As Boghosian and Lindsay said, \u201cOffering evidence\u2014facts\u2014almost never facilitates belief revision for any belief with moral, social, or identity-level salience.\u201d Does this make me an ideologue?<\/p>\n <\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Boghossian, Peter G., and James A. Lindsay. How to Have Impossible Conversations: A Very Practical Guide<\/em>. First edition. New York, NY: Lifelong, 2019. 121.<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Ibid., 29.<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Ibid., 15.<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Ibid, 21.<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Ibid., 68.<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> Ibid., 50.<\/p>\n